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ABSTRACT 
NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task 
of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic 
(lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of 
mission and crew risk, and communicating the results.  
Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems 
designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to 
work together to accomplish mission success.  Some of 
these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage 
equipment, while some have never been previously 
launched.  For these cases, characterizing the epistemic 
uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated 
that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch 
vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage 
equipment would be greater.  For reasons that will be 
discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods 
using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive 
results, and significantly underestimate epistemic 
uncertainty for launch vehicle models.  Furthermore, 
standard PRA methods, such as Uncertainty-Importance 
analyses used to identify components that are significant 
contributors to uncertainty, are rendered obsolete, since 
sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in 
propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods.  
This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty 
underestimation for complex systems and especially, due 
to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles.  It 
then suggests several alternative methods for estimating 
uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results.  
Lastly, the paper describes how to implement an 
Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative 
approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to 
reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional 
data or testing of selected components.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty is an important aspect of any PRA to reflect 
the level of confidence in the models and data used in the 
analysis, and to provide information used for engineering 
and management decisions. In launch vehicles, risks are 
typically considered high [1], compared to most industry 
applications. Uncertainty, especially the upper bounds, 
can aid in anticipated launch commit decisions for NASA.  
As technology advances and new system designs 
populated with first launch hardware are developed for 
more ambitious space applications, estimating uncertainty 
of these designs becomes paramount to mission success.  
Additionally, the ability to characterize the contribution 
of components to the overall uncertainty provides a means 
for supporting testing plans and system development.  
To perform a proper uncertainty analysis for new designs, 
the development of epistemic uncertainty (uncertainty 
due to lack of knowledge) represents a difficult task, both 
in assigning failure probability distribution bounds to new 
components, and in propagating this uncertainty through 
the PRA logic model.  
One would believe that standard Monte Carlo simulation 
provides an appropriate methodology to propagate 
uncertainty through subsequent logic models. However, 
upon further investigation, this method appears to be 
highly questionable, and becomes more of a concern in 
logic models with structures like those that reflect launch 
vehicle designs.  
2. UNCERTAINTY PROGAGATION 
Monte Carlo simulation provides a process to propagate 
uncertainty through a reduced Boolean equation created 
by PRA software to solve logic trees, such as built in the 
Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated 
Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) tool [2].  Probability 
distributions, representing the uncertainty of component 
failure rates, can be randomly sampled using Monte Carlo 
simulation and combined to estimate an uncertainty 
distribution for the top event in the PRA fault-tree model.  
Uncertainty propagation is affected by the logic of the tree 
and in general, AND gates tend to preserve or increase the 
bounds of two numerically similar combined basic events, 
while OR gates reduce this uncertainty. Sensitivity studies 
show the top event in a fault tree with many OR gates is 
insensitive to changes in the epistemic uncertainty of the 
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tree’s basic events. Although this phenomenon was 
known, we did not fully realize the resulting implications 
on PRA until fairly recently, which prompted this paper 
for peer discussion.  
Several simple tests were performed to understand the 
nature and extent of uncertainty changes due to 
propagating in this manner.  It was understood that when 
performing Monte Carlo routines on a Boolean 
expression, the mean results of the PRA mode top event 
could be determined by dominating basic events.  
Therefore in these test cases the basic event failure 
probabilities are all set to the same magnitude.  Moderate 
variances in the magnitude of basic events, such as found 
in typical complex systems, will not significantly affect 
the results of these test cases. This also applies to 
uncertainty, where dominance by any basic event or small 
set of basic events will result in the uncertainty also being 
dominated by those same basic events.  
To facilitate understanding of the nature and extent of this 
reduction, several sample sets were run in SAPHIRE.  
Each sample set was selected to minimize the effect of 
other variables in the solution of the top event and 
emphasize the changes in uncertainty.  Initial test cases 
focused on determining the number of similar events with 
specific logic potentially causing this decrease in 
uncertainty.   
 
To set up the test cases, two small logic trees of ten similar 
events were developed.  Each independent basic event 
was given the same probability distribution.  One logic 
tree contained all OR gates and the other contained all 
AND gates. All basic-event probabilities for these test 
cases used a lognormal distribution with a mean of 1.0E-
5 and an Error Factor (EF) and were uncorrelated (The EF 
for the lognormal distribution is defined as the 95th 
percentile divided by the median.) The EF was varied for 
each test case as was the number of basic events in the 
fault tree logic. For each case, 99999 random SAPHIRE 
trials were run using a random seed, and in all of the cases 
the top event converged. In each case, the uncertainty 
distribution of the top event was a good fit to a lognormal 
distribution that we parameterized using moment 
matching. Tables 1 and 2 below show the test cases and 
top event uncertainty results for the OR gate tree and the 
AND gate tree, respectively. 
 




As can be seen from Table 1, the EF significantly 
decreases as the number of similar basic events increases 
under the top event. Even as the EF is increased to 100, a 
very large and potentially unreasonable EF, the reduction 
in uncertainty of uncorrelated events added together in the 
Boolean expression reduces significantly and is 
essentially diminished compared to the basic event 
uncertainty after ten such events.  Test runs were also 
conducted at a higher mean value (5.0E-5) showing 
similar results.  
 




Table 2 shows some of the AND logic test cases.  As the 
number of basic events increases, the ability to 
characterize the uncertainty becomes more difficult, since 
the result of combining the basic events using Monte 
Carlo becomes unbounded.  
3. CORRELATION AND PRACTICAL 
APPLICATIONS 
Correlation effects were as anticipated in the test cases.  
By correlating some of these events using 100 percent 
positive correlation, the effect was essentially to reduce 
the number of distributions, therefore; the number of basic 
events used by SAPHIRE to determine the uncertainty of 
the top event; Table 1 and Table 2 applies accordingly. In 
our launch vehicle design PRA models, the degree of 
correlation between similar component types (e.g., 
different cable and connector pairs) had some minor 
effects in increasing uncertainty. However, the increase 
was not enough to show sensitivity to increased epistemic 
uncertainty at the component level.   
 
Our belief is that due to the launch vehicle environments, 
for example in ascent, most components at least at the 
system level are partially correlated in some manner.  
Partially correlating all of these components would result 
Number of Basic Events 5 10 15 20 100
2 3.4 6.1 8.6 11.1 44.5
5 2.3 3.8 5.1 6.3 21.3
10 1.9 2.8 3.7 4.5 13.8
20 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.3 9.5
Error Factor
Number of Basic Events 5 10 15 20 100
2 9.6 26.5 47.1 70.9 700.3
3 17.5 NA NA NA NA
4 NA NA NA NA NA
20 NA NA NA NA NA
Error Factor
in greater uncertainty in the logic model. The possibility 
of adding partial correlation was investigated, considering 
the complexity and number of component basic events 
affected.  Even at a system level, this approach was both 
beyond the standard current tool set available and 
introduced additional model uncertainty in ascertaining 
the appropriate partial correlation factors. In addition, 
even if we developed alternative tools and addressed the 
added model uncertainty in assigning partial correlation 
factors, the method of applying partial correlation and 
creating an N-by-N basic event matrix would be daunting 
to develop and apply. Therefore, alternative methods were 
sought to capture epistemic uncertainty.  These methods 
are introduced below. 
4. LAUNCH VEHICLES AND COMPLEX 
SYSTEMS WITH MULTIPLE SAFETY 
BARRIERS DIFFERENCES 
One pertinent question arises concerning uncertainty 
bounds when comparing Monte Carlo simulations used in 
solving complex systems employing multiple safety 
systems and launch vehicle PRAs.  Namely, why is this 
uncertainty reduction effect not as apparent in these PRAs 
and is it an issue?  
 
The answer probably lies in the nature of functionality and 
safety design in these complex systems.  If multiple safety 
barriers can be called on to mitigate accident transients, 
then this redundancy is at the system level and results in 
AND logic (safety redundancy) at the top of the fault tree 
logic.  Launch vehicle design, due to weight reduction, 
optimized aerodynamics/volume, and cost considerations, 
usually features single fault tolerance (redundancy) at the 
subsystem level.  Loss of the avionics system, for 
example, will result in loss of the launch vehicle. In other 
words, launch vehicle redundancy is built-in typically at 
the subsystem level rather than the system or element 
level.  This will be reflected in redundancy, or AND gates 
at a lower level in the logic tree, while the upper portion 
of the tree will have multiple OR gate logic, depicting that  
any loss at the system or element level results in loss of 
the vehicle. After the discussion in Section 2, one can see 
where the differences in the tree logic structure between 
complex systems with multiple safety barriers and launch 
vehicles result in differences in epistemic uncertainty 
propagation. Furthermore, dividing the logic trees into 
phases to ascertain functional and environmental 
differences, as is experienced with launch vehicle 
missions, can only perpetuate the uncertainty reduction 
problem. 
 
Although these complex systems typically preserve or 
increase some uncertainty due to the logic structure of 
these designs using Monte Carlo simulation, it was 
suspected that the uncertainty and uncertainty-importance 
results are as sensitive as needed to be for analytical 
purposes.  In any case, the reduction in epistemic 
uncertainty for systems that have redundancy at a lower 
level using Monte Carlo uncertainty propagation 
techniques in PRA, may be occurring to some extent. 
PRA analysts should be aware of this potential. It is very 
apparent that this reduction is occurring in PRA models 
of launch vehicle designs.  
5. IMPLICATIONS TO LAUNCH VEHICLE 
PRA UNCERTAINTY AND RELATED 
ANALYSES 
One of the main implications of this reduced uncertainty 
effect is the reduced ability  to determine which basic 
events, and thus components, in the model represent a 
significant contributor to  uncertainty due to lack of 
knowledge about that component. This is an artifact of the 
propagation of the logic tree for launch vehicles and basic 
events become insensitive to changes in the uncertainty.  
Often in cases where new equipment is used and 
demonstrated historical data is unavailable, PRA 
component reliability information may reflect like 
equipment or the use of a component in a different 
environment by assigning an increase in the component 
epistemic uncertainty.  This increase would reflect use of 
the component in a different environment, a different 
purpose, or a modified function. The magnitude of the 
increased uncertainty should provide insight into how 
much the “like” component differs from the design 
component and how much lack of knowledge exists 
related to that piece of the design. 
 
Uncertainty-Importance analyses can often identify and 
prioritize components, especially in a design setting, 
where reduced component uncertainty could substantially 
reduce the system-level uncertainty and, therefore; 
improve the credibility bounds of the model.  This can be 
accomplished by further investigation and using more 
applicable failure rate sources for the component, or 
invoking focused component testing. It can be time 
consuming and expensive to research every component in 
a complex system to reduce the level of uncertainty.  
Minimizing the number of components that require 
further investigation could prove to be a time and cost 
saving method, which would avoid performing this for 
every component.  
6. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 
ESTIMATE EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY 
Alternative approaches [3] were explored to estimate and 
maintain uncertainty and express sensitivity to changes in 
component or components groups’ epistemic uncertainty.   
6.1 Partial Correlation Based On Environmental 
Factors 
One such method explored was to apply a partial 
correlation factor across physical or interactive systems. 
The concept is based on environmental factors coupling 
failure rates of unlike components together either due to a 
similar location or similar environmental stress factors. 
Thus partially correlating failure rates would have the 
effect of increasing uncertainty by not treating the events 
as completely independent..  A launch vehicle will often 
have co-located systems due to limited space and volume 
requirements.  For example, the engine compartment may 
include the engine, portions of the main propulsion 
system, and some avionics electronics hardware.  All 
these systems may have some correlated failures 
associated with being co-located in a launch vehicle.   
 
The challenge with this approach is assigning a generic 
partial correlation factor and then implementing the 
correlation.  Implementing a generic correlation factor in 
a custom code to build matrices for a reduced Boolean 
expression was explored. This was a more straight 
forward approach then applying multiple partial 
correlation factors. However, it was found that there was 
a lack of defensible engineering basis to establish generic 
correlation factors for specific systems at this time. 
Although this approach was not finalized, it still remains 
a potential option for improving accuracy of uncertainty 
estimates. The true test of this approach will be 
determined when modifications to the assigned epistemic 
uncertainty are propagated through the logic model and 
exhibit sensitivity to these changes.  
6.2 Interval Approach 
Another approach that we discovered when investigating 
epistemic uncertainty sensitivity was the Interval 
Analysis technique [4].  Interval Analysis claims to 
characterize epistemic uncertainty, as distinguished from 
variability or randomness that is propagated through 
Monte Carlo routines.  Although we do not necessarily 
adhere to this aspect of the concept, we have found the 
Interval Analysis method in our case to be useful in 
characterizing uncertainty and in showing responsiveness 
to assigned changes in epistemic uncertainty of our logic 
models.  
 
Interval Analysis uses a reduced Boolean expression to 
solve a logic model for the top event.  It does this by 
calculating the uncertainty ranges as an upper and lower 
bound (5th and 95th) for each basic event, and then using 
these bounding values to estimate an upper and lower 
bound for the top event [5].  
 
Results from an example complex launch vehicle system 
showed an uncertainty EF (The EF is specific to the 
lognormal distribution and is only used as an 
approximation of the uncertainty) of about 1.5.  
Furthermore, applying a large EF to all basic events in this 
system, such as an EF of 10, showed minimal effects on 
the propagated uncertainty (i.e., EF~2). This effect was 
apparent in all major systems models of the launch 
vehicle.  
 
Epistemic uncertainty for basic events ranged from EFs 
of 4 to 15 with many basic events having an uncertainty 
of around 6.  Using the Interval Analysis technique, the 
uncertainty results showed an uncertainty value of 5.1.   
Uncertainty-Importance measurements [6] were run to 
identify dominant basic event contributors to uncertainty.  
These were grouped according to similarity to each other 
(e.g., Electrical Power, Navigation, and Flight Computer 
Software) and the EF modified for sensitivity to epistemic 
uncertainty.   
 
The Interval Analysis approach responded to changes in 
the initial epistemic uncertainty in a reasonable manner. 
As one important group of basic events were increased 
from an EF of 5 to 10, the EF of the Interval approach 
went from 5.1 to 7.5.  When this same group’s EF was 
decreased to 3, the resulting EF was 3.5.  Less important 
groups, as determined by the Uncertainty-Importance 
routines, had much smaller effects on the uncertainty as 
anticipated.  
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Uncertainty Analysis plays an important role in any PRA 
by describing the confidence around risk estimates.  Much 
of the uncertainty in the design of launch vehicles is due 
to epistemic uncertainty or “lack of knowledge” either 
due to new equipment or technology, or from use of 
heritage equipment in a new environment. In either case, 
the ability to estimate uncertainty at the basic event level 
and establish a method for targeting this uncertainty 
requires an approach that is sensitive to changes in 
uncertainty levels.   
 
Unfortunately, standard methods of uncertainty 
propagation using Monte Carlo techniques do not provide 
this sensitivity for typical launch vehicle design PRA 
models, due to the inherent logic structure that represents 
launch vehicle risks. While this is not a new phenomenon, 
it becomes very apparent when attempting to apply 
sensitivity studies to better understand the uncertainty.  
 
Alternative options were suggested to support 
implementing sensitivity strategies. We found partial 
correlation between unlike components could potentially 
solve this issue and result in an increase in uncertainty 
while maintaining the standard Monte Carlo uncertainty 
propagation methods. However, after further 
investigation, this option was hindered due to the lack of 
engineering data and derivation to estimate partial 
correlation and the lack of tools to accomplish this task.  
 
The Interval Analysis option was also introduced as an 
alternative that may aid in epistemic uncertainty 
approximation and support sensitivity studies on the 
uncertainty to help focus component failure rate data 
investigation, testing, and collection.  This analysis 
methodology was shown to have reasonable uncertainty 
results on a test system PRA model, and be sensitive to 
modifications of the epistemic uncertainty at the basic 
event level.  
 
It is recognized the preferred uncertainty propagation 
approach is to implement partial correlation and use 
Monte Carlo routines. However, implementation of this 
approach will likely require integration of physics-based 
risk models within PRA and advancement of PRA 
techniques to accommodate these models.  Although 
further testing is warranted, the Interval Analysis option 
is a good alternative to provide uncertainty bounds for 
launch vehicle design PRA models and appropriate for 
uncertainty sensitivity studies.  
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